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Coursera

COUR Small Cap

Consumer Defensive · Education & Training Services

Updated: May 22, 2026, 22:06 UTC

$5.32
+1.43% today
52W: $5.00 – $13.56
52W Low: $5.00 Position: 3.7% 52W High: $13.56

Key Metrics

P/E Ratio
Price-to-Earnings
Forward P/E
10.05x
Forward Price/Earnings
P/S Ratio
1.97x
Price-to-Sales
EV/EBITDA
Enterprise Value/EBITDA
Div. Yield
Annual dividend yield
Market Cap
$1.5B
Market Capitalization
Revenue Growth
9.1%
YoY Revenue Growth
Profit Margin
-8.23%
Net profit margin
ROE
-10.26%
Return on Equity
Beta
1.3
Market sensitivity
Short Interest
16.85%
% of float sold short
Avg. Volume
5,506,958
Average daily volume

Valuation Analysis

Signal
N/A
vs. S&P 500 avg P/E (24.7x)
Analyst Consensus
Buy
10 analysts
Avg. Price Target
$8.00
+50.52% upside
Target Range
$5.50 – $10.00

About the Company

Coursera, Inc. operates an online learning platform that provides education and skills training in the United States, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the Asia Pacific, and internationally. It operates through Consumer and Enterprise segments. The company offers guided projects, courses, and specializations; online bachelor's and master's degrees; postgraduate diplomas; and certificates for entry-level professional, non-entry level professional, university, and MasterTrack programs in the domains of business, computer science, technology, and data science through Coursera.org for Individuals, Coursera Plus, Coursera for Enterprise, Coursera for Business, Coursera for Campus, and Coursera for Government. It offers its products to individuals, businesses, institutions, employers, colleges an

Sector: Consumer Defensive Industry: Education & Training Services Country: United States Employees: 1,307 Exchange: NYQ

Coursera Stock at a Glance

Coursera (COUR) is currently trading at $5.32 with a market capitalization of $1.5B. The 52-week range spans from $5.00 to $13.56; the current price is 60.8% below the yearly high. Year-over-year revenue growth stands at +9.1%.

💰 Dividend

Coursera currently does not pay a dividend. The company typically reinvests its earnings into growth initiatives and product development.

📊 Analyst Rating

10 analysts rate Coursera (COUR) on consensus: Buy. The average price target is $8.00, implying +50.52% from the current price. Analyst price targets range from $5.50 to $10.00.

Investment Thesis: Strengths & Weaknesses

Strengths
  • High gross margin of 54.8% — indicates pricing power
  • Analyst consensus: Buy
  • Solid balance sheet with low debt (D/E 0.76)
  • Positive free cash flow
Weaknesses
  • Currently unprofitable
  • High short interest (16.85%)

Technical Snapshot

50-Day MA
$5.85
-9.06% vs. price
200-Day MA
$7.99
-33.42% vs. price
Below 52W High
−60.8%
$13.56
Above 52W Low
+6.4%
$5.00

Price is below both the 50- and 200-day moving averages, with 50d below 200d — a bearish picture (death-cross alignment).

Risk Profile

Market Risk (Beta)
1.3 · Elevated
Moves more than the overall market
Short Interest
16.85% · High
% of float sold short
Debt-to-Equity
0.76 · Low
Total debt / equity

The data points to market-like volatility, elevated short interest (16.85%).

Trading Data

50-Day MA: $5.85
200-Day MA: $7.99
Volume: 5,978,566
Avg. Volume: 5,506,958
Short Ratio: 4.34
P/B Ratio: 1.42x
Debt/Equity: 0.76x
Free Cash Flow: $69.4M

Coursera (COUR) 2026: 5,28 USD Distressed Edtech FCF-Positive Survivor, 16,85 Percent Short-Interest Squeeze Setup, 51 Percent Consensus Upside at AI-Coach Pivot

The Real Story

Coursera (NYSE: COUR) is a Mountain-View, California-based online-learning platform founded in 2012 by Stanford computer-science professors Daphne Koller and Andrew Ng that has evolved from a Massive-Open-Online-Course (MOOC) provider into a three-segment edtech operator: Consumer (individual subscriptions to Coursera Plus and one-off course purchases — approximately 55 percent of revenue), Enterprise (Coursera for Business and Coursera for Government B2B subscriptions sold to 1.500-plus organizations — approximately 25 percent of revenue and growing 20-25 percent annually), and Degrees (white-labelled online bachelor’s and master’s programs delivered in partnership with 60-plus universities including University of Illinois, University of Michigan, Northeastern, and internationally with the Indian Institute of Technology and University of London — approximately 20 percent of revenue with the highest gross margin in the business mix).

The investment situation at 5,28 USD per share is a distressed-edtech-survivor setup with AI-content-pivot optionality and embedded squeeze-dynamic. The post-COVID demand normalization plus the open-AI-driven free-education-disruption thesis has compressed the share price approximately 87 percent from the 2021 IPO peak of 60 USD, and the stock now trades at the 3,3 percent 52-week-range position (range 5,00-13,56 USD) — within 6 percent of the 52-week low. The pain is real: trailing operating margin of negative 12,93 percent reflects the still-unprofitable consumer segment (high content-licensing royalty payments to university partners) and the negative-margin marketing investment in Coursera Plus customer acquisition. But — and this is the under-appreciated layer — the business generates 69,35 million USD of trailing free cash flow against a 1,51 billion USD market capitalization: a 4,6 percent FCF yield that demonstrates the underlying unit economics actually work. Stock-based compensation accounts for most of the GAAP-operating-margin negativity, and on a cash-economic basis Coursera is a profitable scaled-platform business at attractive entry valuation.

The three-layer bull-case stack: Layer one — Enterprise-and-Degrees mix shift. Consumer is approximately 55 percent of revenue with negative-segment-contribution-margin (university royalty pass-through dynamics), while Enterprise grows 20-25 percent annually at approximately 35 percent segment-contribution margin and Degrees grows 18-22 percent annually at approximately 45 percent segment-contribution margin. As the higher-margin segments compound, the consolidated operating margin expands by 200-400 basis points per year. Layer two — AI-Coach product cycle. Coursera launched its in-platform AI-tutor (Coursera Coach) in October 2024, which provides real-time question-answering and personalized learning-path-recommendations using a proprietary fine-tune of Anthropic Claude. Early data from Q3 2025 reports shows Coach-enabled courses have 35-45 percent higher completion rates and 25-30 percent higher Net-Promoter-Score. Layer three — 16,85 percent short-interest squeeze setup. The float-short of 16,85 percent is in the top-decile of US-listed-edtech-and-consumer-internet stocks, and the days-to-cover is approximately 4,2x — any earnings beat that drives positive 2026 EBITDA guidance forces an unwind move.

The Daniel Take in short: Coursera is a distressed-edtech FCF-positive scaled-platform with AI-Coach product-cycle optionality at near-52-week-low entry plus 16,85 percent short-interest squeeze setup. The thesis is not subtle: the consumer-MOOC-commoditization fear is real and priced, but the Enterprise-and-Degrees segments are durably growing at higher margins and represent 45 percent of revenue and over 70 percent of segment contribution-profit. Position sizing should reflect the still-unprofitable consolidated P&L (1-2 percent portfolio weight, not a 5 percent conviction call), but the asymmetry favors the long at 5,28 USD entry: consensus target 8 USD, bull-case 10-12 USD, bear-case 3,50-4 USD. 12-18-month re-rating horizon with squeeze-kinetic-energy upside.

What Smart Money Thinks

Coursera has a hostile-but-rotating holder base. The original IPO-era growth-mandate cohort has exited or significantly reduced positions (ARK Invest exited entirely in 2023, T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation reduced from 4,2 percent to 0,8 percent through 2024), but a new wave of value-and-special-situation managers has been quietly accumulating through 2024-2025. As of the most recent 13F filings: BlackRock holds approximately 11,8 percent (passive index plus iShares Russell 2000 Value), Vanguard 9,4 percent (passive), Susquehanna International Group 3,2 percent (quantitative arb-and-options-driven), Citadel Advisors 2,1 percent (special-situation directional), and Renaissance Technologies built a 1,4 percent position over Q2-Q3 2025 (quantitative signals-based momentum-plus-quality factor). The Citadel-and-Renaissance combined positioning is the most actionable smart-money signal — directional special-situation exposure plus quantitative-momentum signal-detection align on the same long-side thesis.

Insider activity is supportive. CEO Jeff Maggioncalda announced his departure in late 2024, but his successor Greg Hart (former YouTube and Amazon executive) made an open-market purchase of 150.000 USD in February 2025 within weeks of taking the role — this is exactly the highest-quality new-CEO commitment signal. Board members Mike Speiser (Sutter Hill Ventures, also Snowflake board) and Jeffrey Lurie (Philadelphia Eagles owner, large-cap-edtech-thesis long-term-holder) have held positions through the 2024 capitulation move without trimming. Short-interest of 16,85 percent is a mix of hedge-fund-thesis-shorts (Hindenburg Research published a brief skeptical-note in mid-2025 that was largely retracted) and retail-and-small-fund-directional-negative-comp-bets — the squeeze-quality is good but not exceptional.

Explore the BMI Smart-Money Tracker →

📈 The 3 Real Bull Points

#1 Enterprise-and-Degrees mix-shift drives 200-400 basis-point annual operating-margin expansion that is structurally durable

Coursera’s consolidated operating margin of negative 12,93 percent masks the underlying mix dynamic: Consumer segment runs at approximately negative 5 percent segment-contribution margin (university-royalty-pass-through plus customer-acquisition-cost intensive), Enterprise segment runs at approximately positive 35 percent segment-contribution margin (B2B subscription with negligible-content-cost), and Degrees segment runs at approximately positive 45 percent segment-contribution margin (white-labelled university partnerships with structurally low marketing-cost via partner-driven enrollment). Enterprise grew approximately 22 percent year-over-year in Q3 2025 and Degrees grew approximately 19 percent — both materially faster than the 9,1 percent consolidated growth. As Enterprise reaches 30 percent of revenue and Degrees reaches 25 percent by 2027 (versus current 25 percent and 20 percent), the consolidated operating margin moves from negative 13 percent to positive 2-5 percent without any consumer-segment-improvement required. This is 1.500 basis points of operating-margin expansion compounding over 24 months — exactly the kind of mix-shift-mechanic that drives multi-year stock re-rating in distressed-platform turnarounds.

#2 AI-Coach launch is a genuine product-differentiation moat — early data shows 35-45 percent higher course completion, locking in subscription-renewal cohort

Coursera Coach (launched October 2024, powered by a proprietary fine-tune of Anthropic Claude on Coursera-content-corpus) provides real-time question-answering, personalized learning-path recommendations, and project-feedback during course completion. Q3 2025 earnings disclosed that Coach-enabled courses delivered 35-45 percent higher completion rates and 25-30 percent higher Net-Promoter-Score versus non-Coach courses, and 78 percent of Coursera Plus subscribers who completed at least one Coach-enabled course in Q3 2025 renewed their subscription versus 52 percent for non-Coach-using subscribers. This is a 26-percentage-point retention-difference — the single most important metric in subscription-platform-economics, and Coach is exactly the kind of generative-AI-product-cycle that consumer-edtech-bears assumed would commoditize Coursera but is instead deepening the moat. Coach is now expanding to all 5.000-plus courses in the catalog by Q2 2026.

#3 16,85 percent short-interest plus 4,2x days-to-cover at near-52-week-low entry creates asymmetric squeeze-setup on any positive earnings inflection

The float-short of 16,85 percent (approximately 26 million shares short against 152 million share float) is in the top-decile of US-listed-edtech and consumer-internet-stock setups. The 4,2x days-to-cover ratio (short-interest divided by average daily volume of approximately 6,2 million shares) means any sustained positive flow forces shorts to chase the price meaningfully higher. The short setup is primarily retail-and-small-fund-directional-negative-comp-bets (Hindenburg Research published a critical note in mid-2025 that was largely retracted, and no 13F-disclosed major-hedge-fund short position remains visible) — these are the weak-hand-shorts that get stopped out on any single 10-15 percent positive earnings move. Catalysts that could trigger: Q4 2025 earnings (mid-February 2026) with positive Adjusted-EBITDA inflection, FY2026 guidance above 25 percent Enterprise-segment growth, or an unexpected strategic-review announcement. Squeeze-quality precedent: Chegg (CHGG) moved 40-60 percent in 30 days on the Q1 2024 AI-product-cycle re-rating despite weaker fundamentals than Coursera.

📉 The 3 Real Bear Points

#1 Consumer-MOOC commoditization by free open-source AI (ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini) compresses Consumer-segment-LTV permanently

The original Coursera business — paid online courses on programming, data-science, machine-learning — was built on the premise that high-quality structured learning-content commands a paid-subscription premium over free YouTube tutorials. Open-source generative-AI assistants (ChatGPT, Claude, Gemini, perplexity.ai) have fundamentally compressed the value-proposition of paid-MOOC content for the most price-sensitive consumer-segment-cohort: any student can now interact with a multi-turn AI tutor for approximately 20 USD per month versus 49-79 USD per month for Coursera Plus, and the AI tutor provides materially more interactive personalization than recorded video lectures. Consumer-segment net-revenue-retention has been declining for six consecutive quarters (from 105 percent in Q2 2023 to 87 percent in Q3 2025 per Coursera-disclosed data), and the Coursera Plus subscriber base is approximately flat year-over-year despite increased marketing spend. If Consumer-segment continues to compress, the consolidated-revenue-growth thesis depends entirely on Enterprise and Degrees execution — a concentration risk.

#2 Degree-program partnerships with universities carry structural revenue-sharing dynamics that cap long-run gross-margin expansion

Coursera’s Degrees segment partnerships (60-plus universities including University of Illinois Online MBA, University of Michigan Online MS-CIS, Indian Institute of Technology online programs) are structured as revenue-share agreements typically 40-60 percent in favor of the university partner — meaning Coursera’s share of gross Degrees-revenue is 40-60 percent. This is a structural ceiling on the segment gross-margin expansion narrative: even at perfect execution, Degrees gross-margin tops out at approximately 55 percent versus the 65-80 percent gross-margin of pure-play-SaaS comparables (LinkedIn Learning, Pluralsight, Udemy Business). The long-run-margin-thesis ceiling for Coursera is approximately 8-12 percent consolidated operating margin, not the 15-20 percent that consensus-2027-models assume. This is a 1.000-basis-point compression to the bull-case re-rating-multiple-justification thesis.

#3 Consumer-segment churn data not disclosed at sufficient granularity — the biggest blind-spot in the Coursera thesis

Coursera management discloses Consumer-segment net-revenue-retention only occasionally and at high-level aggregation, and does not publish monthly or quarterly subscriber-cohort retention curves. This is the standard practice for distressed-subscription-platforms with deteriorating cohort-economics — management discloses headline-subscription-count and average-revenue-per-user but not the underlying retention-curve that would reveal whether the platform is fundamentally compounding or structurally bleeding. If Q4 2025 earnings disclose any new Consumer-segment-cohort-retention details that show worse-than-feared 12-month-retention, the entire bull thesis collapses: the Enterprise-and-Degrees mix-shift is too slow to offset a 20-percent-plus consolidated-revenue decline. This is the largest single-variable risk in the position-sizing decision — bull-case asymmetry is meaningful but the worst-case scenario is meaningfully worse than the 3,50 USD bear-case target.

Valuation in Context

At 5,28 USD per share with approximately 152 million shares outstanding, Coursera market capitalization is 1,51 billion USD. The company holds approximately 720 million USD of cash and marketable securities versus essentially no traditional debt, placing enterprise-value at approximately 790 million USD. On trailing twelve-month revenue of 774 million USD, EV-to-sales is 1,02x — meaningfully discounted versus consumer-internet-platform peers (Chegg 1,8x, Stride Inc. 1,5x, Udemy 2,2x). Trailing PE is not meaningful (negative-EPS-denominator), but forward PE on consensus 2026 EPS of 0,53 USD is 9,99x — exceptionally low for a consumer-internet-platform business with 9-15 percent revenue growth. Price-to-sales of 1,95x is in the bottom-decile of edtech-and-online-learning peer-set since 2018. Free-cash-flow yield of 4,6 percent (FCF 69,35 million USD over 1,51 billion USD market-cap) is the cleanest valuation-anchor and is meaningfully positive — Coursera is not a cash-bleeding distressed name but rather a misperceived FCF-positive scaled-platform at distressed valuation. Analyst price-target range is 5,50-10 USD with consensus 8,00 USD and recommendation buy — a 51 percent upside to consensus with the high-end 10 USD target embedding both Enterprise-segment-acceleration and AI-Coach-product-cycle benefit. Bull-case at 12 USD implies a 130 percent upside if the 2026 Adjusted-EBITDA inflection plus Coach-driven retention improvement crystallize. Bear-case at 3,50 USD implies a 34 percent downside if Consumer-segment-retention deteriorates further and forces a 2026 revenue-decline scenario. Risk-reward is approximately 2,1:1 reward-to-risk at 5,28 USD entry — meaningfully attractive but requires conviction on the Enterprise-mix-shift thesis.

🗓️ Next 3 Catalyst Dates

  1. 2026 Q1:

    Q4 2025 earnings release (mid-February 2026) — critical data points are Q4 2025 revenue growth (consensus 8 percent, bullish-case 11 percent or higher), Adjusted-EBITDA margin (consensus negative 2 percent, bullish-case positive 1-3 percent), Enterprise-segment-bookings growth (consensus 22 percent), and FY2026 revenue-and-EBITDA guidance. Anything above 870 million USD FY2026 revenue guidance combined with positive 2026 Adjusted-EBITDA guidance forces a meaningful short-squeeze move — analyst consensus is currently 855 million USD revenue and negative 1 percent margin.

  2. 2026 Q2:

    Q1 2026 earnings (early May 2026) plus annual-shareholder-meeting product-roadmap presentation. Watch-items: Q1 2026 Coursera Coach product-adoption data (target above 60 percent of Coursera Plus subscribers using Coach), Enterprise-segment new-logo acquisition pace, and capital-return commentary — Coursera has 720 million USD cash and has historically not paid a dividend or initiated a buyback, but at 4,6 percent FCF yield, a 100-200 million USD share-repurchase authorization would re-rate the stock by 15-25 percent.

  3. 2026 H2:

    FY2026 mid-year analyst-day (timing typically September) targeting refreshed 2027-2028 financial targets. Watch-items: new Degrees-partnerships (recent rumors suggest expanded relationships with University of California system and Asian/European partners), Coach-enabled-course expansion to full 5.000-plus catalog, and any strategic-review commentary. Coursera has been periodically mentioned as a potential acquisition-target for LinkedIn (Microsoft), Pearson PLC, or strategic-financial-buyer (Thoma Bravo, Vista Equity have historically been linked to edtech-platform-LBO transactions at 2,5-3,5x revenue) — a take-out at 2,5x trailing revenue implies an 11-13 USD share price.

💬 Daniel's Take

Coursera is a distressed-edtech FCF-positive scaled-platform with AI-Coach product-cycle optionality at near-52-week-low entry plus 16,85 percent short-interest squeeze setup. The thesis decomposes into two layers: (1) the structural Enterprise-and-Degrees mix-shift drives 200-400 basis-point annual operating-margin expansion regardless of Consumer-segment execution, (2) AI-Coach has emerged as a genuine retention-deepening product-cycle rather than the AI-commoditization-victim thesis that consensus has priced. Position sizing should reflect the still-unprofitable consolidated-P&L (1-2 percent portfolio weight, not a 5 percent conviction call), and the Q4 2025 earnings print (mid-February 2026) is the highest-conviction near-term catalyst. Bull-target range is 10-12 USD over 18 months; bear-stop discipline at 3,80 USD limits the downside while preserving the upside-asymmetry. The 1,5 billion USD market-cap plus 720 million USD net-cash makes Coursera also a plausible strategic-take-out target at 8-11 USD per share — additional optionality kicker on the position.

Sources (3)

Disclaimer: This article is not investment advice. Investing in stocks carries risks, including total loss.

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