Rimini Street

Rimini Street has the most controversial business model in enterprise software: it provides third-party support for Oracle and SAP installations at roughly half the price the vendors charge for their own maintenance contracts. Oracle has sued Rimini at least four times over 15 years. Rimini has paid settlements but kept growing. The customers — Fortune 500 IT departments fed up with paying 22 percent maintenance every year for software that has not changed since 2014 — keep signing.

What changed in 2024 is the pivot to agentic AI ERP. Rimini is now bundling support with AI agents (Rimini Agentic UX) that overlay outdated Oracle EBS and SAP ECC systems and make them feel modern without the multi-year SAP S/4 HANA migration. That positioning matters because the legal-overhang story has dominated the stock for a decade — and now there is a growth narrative the market has not priced in.

Adams Street Partners (insider since pre-IPO) and Manchester Capital have been long-term holders. CEO Seth Ravin owns ~10 percent. No mega-fund 13F whale. The negative book value is from accumulated buybacks plus settlement liabilities — not insolvency.

At $3.46 with $0.36 trailing EPS the trailing P/E is 9.6 and forward P/E is 6.7 — pricing in near-zero growth. EV/EBITDA 8.7. The negative P/B is balance-sheet noise from buybacks, not distress. The market is paying nothing for the agentic-AI optionality.

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Rimini Street is one of those special-situations names where the legal narrative is finally fading and a real growth story is starting. I find the agentic-AI angle particularly interesting because it sidesteps the SAP S/4 HANA migration cost that every CIO dreads. Forward P/E 6.7 with a credible growth lever is asymmetric. I would size 1 to 2 percent in a special-situations sleeve. The risk is customer loss and renewed litigation; the reward is the multiple expanding back to mid-teens if AI traction shows in 2026 reports.