Goldman Sachs

Goldman Sachs closed May 12, 2026 at $945.04 — within 4% of the all-time high of $984. The $279B market cap places GS as the 6th-largest US financial. The 2026 thesis is the cleanest M&A-and-IPO recovery in mega-bank history: Goldman's investment-banking revenue grew +63% YoY in Q1/2026, the trading business added 18%, and asset & wealth management hit $3.2T AUM. Total revenue: $15.5B (+14.5% YoY). Net income: $4.7B. EPS: $14.12. Return on tangible equity: 18.4%.

David Solomon's controversial 2022–2024 strategic missteps (Marcus consumer-bank failure, Greensky exit, Apple Card pressure) are now behind. The post-2024 strategic pivot back to institutional-and-wealth-only generated immediate operating leverage. The $5.5B Petershill Partners GP-stakes business spin (April 2025) returned $4.2B to shareholders. The Marcus deposit base was sold to Capital One in November 2025 for $52B — exiting the consumer-banking adventure cleanly.

The 2026 IB-recovery cycle is real and broad-based. Q1/2026 advisory revenue: $1.4B (+74% YoY), equity capital markets $620M (+110% — Stripe, Klarna, SpaceX IPOs in Q1), debt capital markets $880M (+22%). The pipeline backlog at March 31, 2026: highest in 3 years per management. Goldman's structural-advantage on advisory roles (lead-banker on 38% of >$10B M&A deals announced 2026 YTD) is intact.

Goldman's institutional ownership tilts toward financial-specialty active funds. Capital Group 4.1%, Wellington 2.4%, T. Rowe Price 1.8%. The notable Q1/2026 buyer: BlackRock's flagship active funds added 1.8M shares in Q4/2025–Q1/2026, the largest buyer outside passive flows. Berkshire Hathaway exited its GS position in Q1/2020 at ~$215 — a 4× wrong call when measured against the $945 current price.

The notable absence: Pershing Square (Ackman) and Sequoia Capital Public have never held GS — they view investment-banks as cyclical and below their quality threshold for permanent capital. The 2024–2026 +60% stock rally has been driven primarily by hedge funds rotating from JPMorgan (perceived as more expensive) to Goldman (perceived as more leveraged to the M&A reopening).

Insider activity (Form 4): CEO David Solomon sold 32,000 shares in February 2026 at $920 average (10b5-1 routine). President John Waldron sold 18,000 shares. The notable absence: Solomon has not bought open-market shares since 2017. Lloyd Blankfein (Solomon's predecessor, now retired) still holds his original 480,000-share stake — has never sold, suggesting confidence in long-term franchise even as Solomon era controversies played out.

Goldman Sachs trades at a forward P/E of 14.4, P/TBV of 1.9, and ROTCE of 18.4% as of May 2026. Comparable mega-bank peers — Morgan Stanley (forward P/E 15.0, P/TBV 2.7, ROTCE 23%), JPMorgan (forward P/E 12.7, P/TBV 2.5, ROTCE 22%) — show GS at a discount despite cyclical-recovery tailwinds. The discount reflects: GS's lower wealth-management mix (less stable revenue), historical Solomon-controversy overhang, and Basel-III capital constraints. Wall Street median price target $947.60 (0.3% upside) — consensus has caught up. Dispersion: $810 (Bernstein, trading-normalization bear) to $1,150 (Wells Fargo, M&A-supercycle bull). Sum-of-the-parts: Investment Banking franchise at $400/share (10× peak-cycle earnings), Trading at $300/share (cycle-mid), Asset & Wealth Management at $180/share, Platform Solutions at $30/share, Net cash $35/share — total $945/share, essentially current price.

1. July 15, 2026: Q2/2026 earnings — advisory pipeline conversion and trading revenue normalization trajectory
2. September 2026: Federal Reserve stress test results — GS Stress Capital Buffer outcome drives 2027 buyback authorization
3. January 2027: Q4/2026 earnings + 2027 guidance — first FY 2027 framework includes Basel-III-Endgame impact on capital return

Goldman Sachs at $945 is the most-leveraged-to-the-M&A-recovery position in mega-bank — and that has been the right call from 2024 through Q1/2026. But at 90% of 52-week high and forward P/E 14.4 (at the 5-year median), the recovery is now priced. The Berkshire 2020 exit at $215 was a 4× wrong call, but Buffett's revealed-preference is to not own investment-banks — and at current levels I am not adding to a position where cyclical-revenue normalization is the base case. My add-trigger is below $780 (sub-12× forward, sub-1.6× P/TBV) which would require either trading-revenue normalization or a broader bank-correction. For long-term holders who bought during the 2022–2023 lows in the $300–$400 range, holding makes sense — for new entrants, the asymmetry has compressed. Watching.